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THE SOMETIMES UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL PRACTICE THROUGHOUT 
HISTORY 
THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH. Steven G. 
Calabresi1 and Christopher S. Yoo.c New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 2008. Pp. xiii +544. $60.00. 
Harold J. Krent' 
Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo's book The Unitary 
Executive presents an excellent inquiry into the concept of a cen-
tralized executive throughout our history. The authors' goal is to 
persuade the reader that all presidents have viewed the power to 
supervise and remove subordinates as central to the very mean-
ing of "executive power" in Article II of the Constitution. With-
out such an ability, presidents would be unable to execute the 
law effectively and place their stamp on the administration. The 
authors succeed in attaining that goaL for the record they por-
tray reveals a long tradition of forceful assertion of presidential 
rights to control policy through close supervision of officers 
within the executive branch. 
In assessing the history. the authors focus on ''the presi-
dent's constitutional power to remove and direct subordinates, 
including those in entities like the Treasury Department, the 
Post Office, federal prosecutors. and the independent agencies 
that some have said are beyond presidential powers of control" 
(p. 418). All forty-three presidents (prior to the current Admin-
istration) have embraced a conception of the unitary executive 
that at least encompasses the powers to remove and supervise 
their subordinates' exercise of delegated authority so as to create 
one centralized executive branch. Moreover. an unbroken his-
I. Professor of Law. Northwestern Universitv. 
2. Professor of Law and Communication. Un"iversitv of Pennsvlvania Law School. 
3. Dean and Professor. liT Chicago-Kent Colleg~ of Law. i thank Tom Merrill 
and Mark Rosen for commenting on an earlier draft. 
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torical practice, in their view, lends considerable force to the 
contemporary question of whether the unitary executive ideal is 
grounded in the Constitution.4 Their normative view embraces 
the unitary executive concept, and they accordingly critique cur-
rent doctrine, in particular, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Morrison v. Olson,' for permitting Congress to limit the execu-
tive's removal authority over agency officials (pp. 377-78). To 
them, the existence of independent agencies cannot be squared 
with the historical recognition of the importance of the presi-
dent's removal authority." 
Had the authors only addressed the removal authority,7 
their argument would have been convincing. But the authors 
claim to be addressing the entire panoply of authorities that can 
be traced to the unitary executive. The authors never delineate 
which powers-other than the appointment and removal author-
ities-are critical to the unitary executive ideal." Thus, it is diffi-
cult, at times, to ascertain whether the authors present a histori-
cal incident to further their thesis that presidents have 
consistently asserted a particular power, like the removal author-
ity. or rather merely to applaud a president's actions. 
For example, the authors write of President Lincoln's unila-
teral efforts to prepare the Union for war (pp. 165-69), but it is 
not clear why. A presidential power to act outside of congres-
sional will, which they at times criticize (pp. 174-78), seems far 
from falling within a unitary ideal. Moreover, they describe at 
length the Supreme Court decision in In re Neagle," which af-
4. P. 4 ("[A] foundational principle of law is that to some degree what the law is 
on the books is determined by what it actually is in practice."). Similarly. to the extent 
that Congress or the courts consistently claim a particular view. that evidence should be 
relevant as well to the ultimate meaning of a constitutional provision. whether in Article 
I. II. or Ill. The authors suggest that the views of the coordinate branches have not been 
as consistent as those of the executive branch. (pp. 16. 28). 
5. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
6. In making their case. the authors only touch tangentially on a wide panoply of 
other presidential powers. whether the pardon power or the power to serve as Com-
mander-in-Chief. Their book. therefore. does not explore some of the most controversial 
exercises of presidential power during President George W. Bush's Administration-the 
sanction of torture. the spying on U.S. citizens. and the incarceration of enemy comba-
tants at Guantanamo Bav. 
7. The authors la;gely rely only on the removal authority. Longstanding criticism 
by presidents as to congressional efforts to limit the appointment authority would have 
bolstered their thesis. See HAROLD J. KRENT. PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 24-36 (2005). 
8. In the conclusion. the authors summarize their findings by category such as "in-
dependent counsels." "the civil service." "independent agencies." and so forth (pp. 417-
28). They do not specify. however. which attributes of the unitary executive have been 
consistently adhered to by presidents throughout history. 
9. 135 u.s. 1 (1890). 
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firmed a realm of inherent presidential power in sustaining an 
executive branch decision-in the absence of congressional au-
thorization- to detail a marshal to protect the life of a threat-
ened Supreme Court Justice (pp. 221-24). 10 There is a conceiva-
ble but by no means ineluctable connection between that 
decision and the unilateral executive. 11 Similarly, the authors 
commend presidents who have asserted the power to construe 
the constitution for themselves, but do not explain why that au-
thority fits within their conception of the unitary executive (pp. 
69-71, 80, 98). 12 The exercise of the veto power, which the au-
thors discuss at several points, seems even more tangential (pp. 
95, 99, 135-36, 153, 385). The book suffers from lack of a tax-
onomy of powers linked to the unitary executive conception: a 
strong executive is not necessarily a unitary one. 
The unitary executive ideal as traditionally understood fo-
cuses not on the relationship between the president and the 
coordinate branches but more narrowly on the relationship be-
tween the president and subordinates within the executive 
branch. That is why the appointment and removal authorities are 
so key under this "superintendence" theory. In the absence of 
such authorities. Congress could delegate key functions to inde-
pendent presidential subordinates so as to preclude effective 
centralized control of executive authority by a president. The 
power of a president to disagree with the Supreme Court's con-
stitutional interpretations or to act in the absence of congres-
sional authorization is beside the point. The historical evidence 
10. They add that "[i]t is inconceivable that an administration that endorsed [At-
torney General] Miller's Lincolnian interpretation of Article II would not also believe 
that the president had the authority to control subordinate executive officials in their ex-
ecution of federal law" (p. 223). The authors simply do not make the case that all who 
believe that the president has inherent authority to act to protect the nation. in the ab-
sence of a statute to the contrary. must believe in the power to dismiss subordinates at 
wilL much less to nullify any actions taken pursuant to congressional direction. 
11. Presumably. if presidents can act in the absence of legislation to pursue meas-
ures protecting the public welfare. they can ignore congressional limits on the presiden-
tial removal authority or congressional specification that particular executive branch offi-
cials (as opposed to the president) are to make certain decisions. But. the connection is 
indirect. In any event. the authors dismiss Supreme Court decisions with which they dis-
agree. such as Humphrey's Executor v. United States. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). so the relev-
ance of celebrating In re Neagle is unclear. 
12. In addition. the authors laud President Wilson for vetoing legislation that 
sought to vest in congressional committees a continuing say over executive policymaking 
(p. 256). They do not connect how opposition to congressional meddling can be equated 
to preservation of the unitary executive ideal. See alsop. 155 (addressing Pierce's opposi-
tion to a type of congressional veto): p. 282 (addressing FDR's vetoes of similar congres-
sional efforts). 
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presented in the book is thus overinclusive. confusing the reader 
as to the scope of the authors· claims. 
Moreover. the evidence addressed is underinclusive as well. 
For while the material presented to demonstrate longstanding 
executive views with respect to the removal authority is impres-
sive. no comparable evidence is presented with respect to other 
potential attributes of the unitary executive ideal. For instance. 
the unitary executive principle should prompt presidents to cen-
tralize authority through executive orders (pp. 12-13) and 
through efforts to reorganize the executive branch irrespective 
of Congress's initial assignment of authority. The authors in-
clude mention of these attributes. 1' but do not treat them in the 
same depth or with the same consistency as the removal authori-
ty. 
The authors stress another possible attribute of the unitary 
executive principle. namely that the president must have the 
power not merely to supervise subordinates. but to supplant 
their authority directly. They state that •·[ a ]ll subordinate nonle-
gislative and nonjudicial officials exercise executive power ... 
only by implicit or explicit delegation from the president" (p. 4). 
With that statement, they suggest that Congress plays only an at-
tenuated role in designating the officer to exercise particular ex-
ecutive functions given that the president retains authority to 
exercise all delegated authority directly. No matter what powers 
Congress assigns to particular officeholders. the president can 
make the final decision. Later. the authors repeat that there has 
been a consistent view that the president exercises the "power to 
nullify or veto subordinate executive officials' exercise of discre-
tionary executive authority" (p. 14). Indeed. President George 
W. Bush's administration recently advanced a similar view that 
only presidents exercise the "executive .. power, and that there-
fore gresidents may nullify anything performed by a subordi-
nate. 
13. The authors address President Taft's reorganization efforts in some depth (p. 
250). as well as those of President Wilson (p. 257). but do not analyze presidential views 
towards reorganization across administrations. Interestingly. President Reagan's own 
Office of Legal Counsel disclaimed that there had been any consistent presidential prac-
tice with respect to reorganizing the executive branch in the absence of authorization 
from Congress: "This understanding has also generally been reflected in the Executive 
Branch's acquiescence in the need for reorganization legislation in order to restructure or 
consolidate agencies within the Executive Branch." Limitations on Presidential Power to 
Create a New Executive Branch Entitr to Receive and Administer Funds Under Foreign 
Aid Legislation. 9 OP. OFF. LEGAL COC:-iSEL 76. 78 (1985). 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 27-51. 
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As a matter of history, there is no longstanding agreement 
among presidents as to a '"nullification" power. The book itself 
provides scant evidence of any presidential power to nullify acts 
of subordinates. 15 The authors elide concepts of control and nul-
lification, persuasively arguing only as to the former. Thus, al-
though the depth and breadth of the evidence they marshal to 
support a robust presidential removal power are impressive, 
their further argument as to historical grounding for a nullifica-
tion power is wholly unpersuasive. 
Moreover, the authors overlook a corollary to their unitary 
executive conception: given that subordinates speak in the presi-
dent's name, presidents should stand accountable for subordi-
nates' actions. The closer the control claimed by a president over 
subordinates-as reflected most clearly in the authors' nullifica-
tion thesis-the more a president should stand accountable for 
all actions within the executive branch. In litigation against the 
federal government, however. presidents have argued that the 
executive branch is comprised of independent governmental ent-
ities, and that each must be sued before relief can be accorded. 
Presidents thereby have reinforced the notion that executive 
branch agencies possess distinct legal personalities, undermining 
the authors' thesis of a consistent presidential assertion of a 
power to supplant the decisionmaking of subordinates. The au-
thors-and to my knowledge, nearly all other commentators-
have overlooked that questions concerning the unitary executive 
have surfaced in routine litigation initiated by private parties 
against the federal government. In short, although Professors 
Calabresi and Yoo's book is wonderfully informative about pres-
idential views concerning the unitary executive as a control me-
chanism, it slights the salience of the same theory in litigation 
against the federal government. At the end, examining these re-
lated contexts should not render the authors' historical examina-
tion superfluous, but it does suggest that the presidential practice 
outside of the removal authority context has not been as uniform 
as the authors suggest. 
In Part I, I review the book, and highlight the authors' stress 
on the importance of the removal power to understand the uni-
tary executive ideal. The authors present a cornucopia of exam-
15. For normative defenses of a nullification power. indeed from one of the au-
thors. see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson. The Unitary Execwive, Jurisdiction Strip-
ping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Texfllalist Response to Justice Scalia. 107 COLL'C\1. L. 
REV. 1002 (2007): Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash. The President's Power to 
Execllle the Laws.104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994). 
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pies to demonstrate how presidents have viewed the removal 
power as sacrosanct. The very accumulation of the historical ma-
terials discussed strongly supports their view of the centrality of 
the appointment and removal powers in providing presidents 
with unitary control over the executive branch. 
In Part IL however, I suggest that the authors' more limited 
focus on a presidential power to nullify acts of subordinates is 
misguided. Some administrations, most notably that of George 
W. Bush, have asserted that the Constitution vests presidents 
with plenary control over all authority delegated to the executive 
branch. To President Bush and others, a unitary presidency de-
mands not only the power to hire and fire, but also the preroga-
tive to exercise personally all authority delegated by Congress. 
Irrespective of one's normative reaction to such an assertion-
and I have critiqued it in the pase6 - the authors' excellent histo-
ry on the removal power is not repeated here. They simply have 
not made the historical case for any such nullification power. 
Finally. in Part III, I sketch in a more tentative fashion the 
previously unexplored implications of the unitary executive in 
the litigation context-when the executive branch is defending 
itself in litigation against suit filed by private entities and indi-
viduals. Presidents in a wide variety of cases have not hesitated 
to rely on a fragmented executive branch to dismiss claims. They 
have argued that cases should be dismissed because the wrong 
federal governmental entity was named and due to the fact that 
insufficient governmental entities were before the court to per-
mit effective redress. They have recognized that federal agencies 
have distinct legal personalities. The litigation stances do not 
comport with the authors· insistence on a consistent executive 
belief in the ability to supplant agency determinations. The his-
torical evidence, in other words, provides a more cabined under-
standing of the unitary executive than the authors and President 
Bush's administration would have us believe. 
16. Harold J. Krent. From a Unirary to a Unilateral Presidency. 88 B.U. L. REV. 523 
(2008). 
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REMOVAL AND 
APPOINTMENT AUTHORITY 
A. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE IDEAL 
495 
The idea of a unitary executive is neither new nor radical. 
The Framers rejected several proposals to split the executive. 
and there have been adherents of a strong centralized executive 
ever since. 17 The language of Article II seemingly embraces some 
form of unitary executive by vesting "the executive power" in a 
president; assigning the president the responsibility to "take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed;" directing the president to 
appoint all principal officers of the United States, and empower-
ing the president to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the prin-
cipal Officer in each of the executive Departments upon any 
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices. " 1x 
To most commentators, arguments for greater centralized 
control based on the unitary executive ideal have coalesced 
around two virtues: accountability and effective leadership. The 
constitutional structure stresses accountability in order to secure 
individual liberty. Articles L II, and III delineate powers that the 
branches are to exercise so as to clarify the lines of constitutional 
authority. The president stands responsible for all discharge of 
policy, and is judged by his or her performance on election day. 
To be sure, voters cannot always call the president to account for 
one particular issue given that they vote for a candidate based 
upon that candidate's entire record. Nor may the president be 
able to stand for reelection. Nonetheless, the political process 
remains open to air misgivings about presidential leadership and, 
as those concerns mount in importance, they may become de-
terminative at election time if not for the president, then for his 
party. As the authors put it, the question of control "is not a lib-
eral or a conservative issue, but rather one of good government'' 
(p. 7). Indeed, Alexander Hamilton noted in the Federalist Pa-
pers that: 
it often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, 
to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a 
pernicious measure ... ought really to fall .... The cir-
cumstances which may have led to any national miscar-
riage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that 
where there are a number of actors who may have had 
17. SeeKRENT.supranote7.at 12-16. 
IX. U.S. CONST. Art. II.§ 2. 
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diffe~ent degrees and kind of agency ... it may be im-
practicable to pronounce to whose account the evil 
which may have been incurred is truly chargeable. 1 ~ 
Liberty is gained to the extent that one electorally accountable 
official stands responsible for such law implementation efforts. 
With a plural executive. responsibility may be shrouded, and the 
costs of determining who was responsible for what increase. 
B. EXECUTIVE PRACTICE 
To demonstrate the historical importance of this governing 
principle, the authors trace each president's views and actions 
reflecting on the unitary executive theory. They focus on anum-
ber of administrations in particular during which controversy 
over the president"s removal authority arose. Throughout our 
history. presidents zealously have safeguarded the power to ap-
point and remove federal officials, despite pressure from Con-
gress. The following is a sampling drawn from the book. 
President Washington's administration was criticaL for the 
first debates over the removal authority arose shortly after he as-
sumed office. The authors argue that Congress's ultimate deci-
sion to vest in the president the removal authority over newly 
minted federal governmental positions demonstrates the impor-
tance placed on such centralized control. The so-called Decision 
of 1789 has been widely studied in the past. under which Con-
gress provided that the president be able to remove the Secre-
tary of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of Treasury from office 
at will (pp. 35-36). The authors assert that the congressional de-
cision to vest a plenary removal authority in the president re-
flected a constitutional view as opposed to a policy preference. 
The fact that the debate was closely contested with respect to the 
Secretary of the Treasury has suggested to others that Congress 
was far from convinced that the Constitution mandated that the 
president be empowered to remove executive officials at will. 
The authors. however. focus rather on the fact that President 
Washington exercised the same control over the Treasury Secre-
tary as he did over the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and that he 
did not hesitate to remove a number of executive branch officials 
with whom he was not pleased (pp. 44-45). The authors subse-
quently endeavor to show that the president exercised supervi-
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 70. at 428 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed .. 
1961). 
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sory control over criminal law enforcement of federal laws (pp. 
47-52). The fact that private relators. grand juries. and state 
prosecutors played a far greater role than today does not un-
dermine their thesis.'" but does raise questions as to how close 
the control over law enforcement in fact was. 
The authors also argue that the Washington administration 
exercised close control. or at least could have. over the executive 
commissions created during his tenure in office. The authors 
point out that the apparent independence of the Patent Office 
and a federal commission to inspect the mint did not cut to the 
contrary and that the president for all intents and purposes re-
tained significant control (pp. 52-53). Only the structure of the 
Bank of the United States gives the authors pause. and that 
structure, they argue. may have stemmed from a view. since re-
pudiated. that monetary policy was separate from governmental 
policy (pp. 53-54). 
The authors also focus on President Jackson's administra-
tion, both for his assertive leadership and for his claims of ex-
pansive executive power. In terms of the removal authority. 
Jackson was not shy in dismissing officeholders upon assuming 
the reins of power (p. 100). Moreover. President Jackson dem-
onstrated a personal interest in law enforcement. ordering ter-
mination of condemnation proceedings against the jewels owned 
by the Princess of Orange (p. 103). 
In the battle over the Second Bank of the United States. 
President Jackson's views of the scope of the unitary executive 
became more manifest. He ordered Secretary of State Duane to 
remove deposits held in the Bank but Duane. who had been an 
ally, refused (p. 108). Jackson dismissed Duane. the deposits 
were removed. and the Senate counteracted with a censure. 
Jackson then responded that, because Article II made him "re-
sponsible for the entire action of the executive department. it 
was but reasonable that the power of appointing, overseeing, 
and controlling those who execute the laws-a power in its na-
ture executive-should remain in his hands" (p. 111). He contin-
ued that "it is a necessary consequence that he should have a 
right to employ agents of his own choice to aid him in the per-
20. The authors argue that the president. as a theoretical matter. could have or-
dered private relators or state law enforcement officials to drop or alter a prosecution. 
Even if true. which is by no means clear. it remains incontrovertible that the president 
lacked control over the initimion of law enforcement. See Harold J. Krent. Executive 
Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from Historv. 38 A\1. U. L. REV. 
275 (1989). . . 
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formance of his duties. and to discharge them when he is no 
longer willing to be responsible for their acts" (pp. 111-12). The 
House. too. debated the issue. but President Jackson stood his 
ground (p. 117). and ultimately prevailed. Jackson relied on the 
removal authority to unify execution of the law. 
Challenges of the Civil War and Reconstruction bring to 
light Presidents Lincoln and Johnson's convictions that strong 
centralized control was indispensable to effective presidential 
governance. President Lincoln's decisive acts during the Civil 
War manifested a strong unitarian conception of the presidency. 
Indeed. any other view during that tumultuous period may have 
stvmied his efforts to combat the crisis. 
As noted before, however. the authors relate a number of 
measures that cannot be ascribed to any unitarian conception of 
the executive branch. For instance. they relate that, at the outset 
of the war. President Lincoln mobilized troops and supplies 
without congressional authorization (p. 166), ordered a naval 
blockade of southern ports, and unilaterally suspended the writ 
of habeas corpus (pp. 166-67). Many of his actions left Congress 
scrambling to keep up. 
With respect to supervision of the executive branch. Lincoln 
removed his first Secretary of War, Simon Cameron. for insu-
bordination in arming fugitive slaves for the Union Army (p. 
171 ). He also removed from office almost the entire group of 
presidential appointees who held office under his predecessor. 
Although President Lincoln justly is remembered for his unilate-
ralism and energy in responding to secession. the authors stress 
that he also understood the critical importance of the removal 
power in coordinating the executive branch. 
President Andrew Johnson pursued his own views of Re-
construction unilaterally, but without Lincoln's skill. President 
Johnson refused to implement the congressional design to pu-
nish leaders of the secession, protect the newly freed slaves, and 
integrate the South back into the Union on Congress's terms. 
Although impeachment efforts might have resulted from his con-
tinued efforts to thwart Reconstruction (pp. 176-78), the first 
impeachment of a president in our nation's history stemmed in-
stead from a deep conflict between Congress and the President 
over the removal authority. 
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Congress passed the Tenure of Office Act' 1 to provide that 
all civil officers appointed with the advice and consent of the Se-
nate would hold office until their successors were confirmed by 
the Senate. Cabinet members were treated slightly differently 
and made subject to the president's removal authority but only if 
the Senate consented. President Johnson vetoed the bilL arguing 
in his message "'[t]hat the power of removal is constitutionally 
vested in the President of the United States is a principle which 
has been not more distinctly declared by judicial authority and 
judicial commentators than it has been uniformly practiced upon 
by the legislative and executive departments of the government" 
(p. 180). He defended the removal authority not only upon his-
torical grounds but also on the separation of powers structure in 
the Constitution: the executive branch must be "capable ... of 
executing the laws and, within the sphere of executive action, of 
preserving, protecting. and defending the Constitution of the 
United States" (p. 181 ). Congress overrode the veto. 
President Johnson subsequently attempted to remove from 
office War Secretary Edwin Stanton, a holdover from the Lin-
coln administration who remained on good terms with the radi-
cals in Congress. Initially, Johnson complied with the Act and 
submitted the reasons for the removal to the Senate, although he 
accompanied the message with a call for repeal of the Act on the 
grounds of its unconstitutionality: ''The President is the respon-
sible head of the Administration, and when the opinions of a 
head of Department are irreconcilably opposed to those of the 
President in grave matters of policy and administration there is 
but one result which can solve the difficulty, and that is a sever-
ance of the official relation'' (p. 182). The Senate refused to ap-
prove Stanton's ouster. 
President Johnson a month later ordered that Stanton leave 
office. Stanton refused, precipitating the constitutional chal-
lenge. The Senate passed a resolution condemning the ouster as 
a violation of the Act, and Johnson responded that "[t]he uni-
form practice from the beginning of the Government, as estab-
lished by every President who has exercised the office, and the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have settled 
the question in favor of the power of the President to remove all 
officers excepting a class holding appointments of a judicial cha-
racter" (p. 185). 
21. Act of Mar. 2. 1867. ch. 154. 14 Stat. 430. Congress repealed the Act in 1887. 
Act of March 3. 1887. ch. 353.24 Stat. 500. 
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The House thereupon commenced impeachment proceed-
ings. the primary charge consisting of the violation of the Tenure 
of Office offense. The House overwhelmingly voted to impeach 
the President. The Senate ultimately failed by a single vote to 
convict on impeachment articles related to the removal of Stan-
ton. Thus, although the impeachment reflects a congressional de-
termination that Congress enjoyed the power to limit the presi-
dent's removal authority, President Johnson's steadfast refusal 
to cave in followed a long line of presidents who viewed the re-
moval authority as a key determinant of presidential power. 
President Franklin Roosevelt assumed great centralized 
power. both to combat the threat within caused by the Depres-
sion. and the threat of German domination from without. Upon 
entering office he issued an executive order transferring all legal 
authority to the Justice Department, and he shifted the Bureau 
of the Budget from the Treasury to the Executive Office of the 
President (p. 280). FDR as would his successors, utilized the ex-
ecutive order as a means of asserting tighter control over subor-
dinates on a wide variety of issues. 
FDR also jealously guarded his removal power. objecting 
when Congress attempted to force him to remove subordinates 
because of their allegedly radical views (p. 283). Moreover, FDR 
dismissed the Chairman of the FfC, William Humphrey, be-
cause of his right wing views (pp. 283-84). That dismissal 
prompted a lawsuit. and the FDR Justice Department argued to 
the Supreme Court that the restrictions in the FfC Act consti-
tute "a substantial interference with the constitutional duty of 
the President to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed."' 
The brief further argued that the type of duties exercised by the 
FfC in no way undermined the need for executive branch con-
trol through the removal authority (pp. 283-84). In its decision in 
Humphrey's Executor v. United States.'' the Supreme Court em-
braced a limitation on dismissals for all executive officials exer-
cising quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions, thus protect-
ing the independence of certain agencies from direct presidential 
control. Congress reacted by inserting for the first time limita-
tions on removal in a number of statutes (p. 287). 
Moreover. FDR sought to reorganize the executive branch 
substantially. convening what was to be called later the Brown-
low Commission to enhance the effectiveness of presidential 
leadership. The Commission recommended that the independent 
22. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
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agencies be integrated into executive departments so as to pre-
vent their centripetal pull. Indeed. if the agencies proliferated. 
the Commission warned that the president"s ··stature is bound to 
diminish. He will no longer in reality be the Executive. but only 
one of many executives, threading his way around obstacles 
which he has no power to overcome" (p. 293). The Commission 
also recommended centralizing budget authority further, and 
vesting in the president continuing authority to reorganize the 
executive branch as conditions changed. FDR embraced the 
Commission's recommendations. but Congress resisted, and ul-
timately handed FDR a stinging setback. 
Upon reviewing the first fifty years after the launch of the 
modern independent administrative agencies. the authors con-
clude that presidents consistently asserted the constitutional pre-
rogative to rein in that independence. Both through efforts to 
reorganize the executive branch and through deployment of the 
removal authority, presidents acted congruent with the unitary 
executive ideal. 
With respect to our most recent president. the authors note 
President George W. Bush's assertion of the right to fire any 
official with whom he disagreed in the newly formed Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (p. 408). In the face of serious alle-
gations about wrongdoing within his administration. Bush ap-
pointed not an independent special prosecutor but a United 
States Attorney (Patrick Fitzgerald) to investigate whether ex-
ecutive branch officials had illegally disclosed the identity of a 
CIA operative, Valerie Plame (p. 410). President Bush expanded 
the regulatory review program and, in so doing, directed that 
regulatory review officers within each agency re1;ort not to the 
agency head but to the president himself (p. 413).-
The focus on the administrations above. however, should 
not obscure that the authors evaluate each presidency with ref-
erence to the executive's power to remove subordinates. All 
viewed the removal authority as critical to the effective exercise 
of executive power. Even the creation of administrative agencies 
and the civil service system did not erode presidential assertions 
of a robust removal authority. both before and after the Humph-
rey's Execlltor decision. 
23. See Exec. Order No. 13.422. 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. U( 2007). President Obama 
has since reversed that Order. See Exec. Order No. 13.497. 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30. 
2009). • 
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Indeed, the authors take pains to track presidential reac-
tions to the independent agencies. They write that Presidents 
McKinley, Roosevelt, Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge all be-
lieved that they controlled the independent agencies and in fact 
at times directed their actions, as might be expected before the 
Humphrey's Executor precedent (e.g., pp. 234-35, 242, 257-59, 
265-66). Presidents Roosevelt and Harding proposed consolidat-
ing independent agencies into new executive departments (pp. 
241, 262), and it was President Wilson's discharge of postmaster 
first class Frank Myers that ultimately led to the Supreme 
Court's broad defense of the president's removal authority in 
Myers v. United States,'~ a case which was briefed under the su-
pervision of President Coolidge. 
Frustration with the expansion of independent agencies 
continued after Humphrey's Executor during the administrations 
of every successive president. Presidents from Truman to John-
son railed against the notion that the independent agencies were 
outside the executive's orbit, and the first President Bush threat-
ened at the end of his administration to remove all nine mem-
bers of the independent Postal Service Board of Governors for 
failing to comply with a directive to abandon a position main-
tained in a postal rate fight (p. 389).25 (The courts came to the 
rescue of the Service and protected the Governors' tenure in of-
fice.'") And, it was President Clinton who first imposed formal 
regulatory oversight over the independent agencies, requiring 
them to share proposed rules with the Office of Management 
and Budget prior to final issuance (pp. 393-95). In many re-
spects, therefore, presidents even after Humphrey's Executor 
and Morrison v. Olson have attempted to limit the ambit of in-
dependent agencies so as to preserve greater authority for the 
unitary executive. 
Based on this wealth of information, the authors conclude 
that presidents historically have believed that they could remove 
from office all executive branch officials, whether "independent" 
or not, for reasons of policy. They do not clarify further whether 
such removals can be reviewed by judges to ensure that the re-
movals stem from policy differences, as opposed to reasons of 
spite or bias, and there are few relevant presidential announce-
ments on that score. Nonetheless, the authors make a strong case 
24. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
25. The courts rebuffed President Bush's effort. enjoining removal of the Gover-
nors. See Mail Order Ass"n of Am. v. U.S. Postal Serv .. 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
26. KRE'\T. supra note 7. at 67~8. 
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that, without the removal authority, presidents cannot attain 
centralized control of executive branch implementation of the 
law. 
II. ADDITIONAL CLAIMS OF THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE 
Although the book is styled as a history of the unitary ex-
ecutive, the authors rigorously analyze only the removal authori-
ty. The unitary executive ideal should also include, at a mini-
mum, efforts to reorganize the executive branch and to funnel 
delegated authority through the White House, such as through 
executive orders. The authors note the development of executive 
orders and efforts to reorganize the executive branch, but do not 
trace each president's actions with respect to these attributes. 
The authors assert an additional presidential prerogative 
that they claim has been consistently adhered to by presidents. 
They argue that presidents should be able to nullify any act by a 
subordinate with which they disagree. In other words, presidents 
cannot only remove officers with whom they disagree, they can 
directly supplant their authority and change their decisions. Al-
though they do not flesh out their theory, they apparently are of 
the view that congressional delegations of authority to particular 
officeholders are only provisional- the president can personally 
exercise that power if he so chooses, and perhaps even reassign 
that power to someone else. Without the power to nullify acts of 
executive officials, presidents could not be fully accountable for 
executive branch administration of the law. 
The authors relate some incidents in which presidents coun-
termanded the orders of subordinates. For instance, they report 
that Presidents Grant and Cleveland overruled decisions by their 
secretaries of the interior, but do not amplify (pp. 192-93, 210).D 
They also recount an incident in which President Jefferson's ef-
forts to direct a customs collector to take a particular action 
were rebuffed by a reviewing court, much to President Jeffer-
son's displeasure (pp. 73-74). Attorney General Caleb Cushing 
during the Pierce administration voiced support for a nullifica-
tion power (p. 155). The first President Bush issued a number of 
signing statements protesting Congress's decision to impose ob-
27. See also p. 147 (recounting that President Tavlor"s administration asserted the 
power to direct accounting officials). · 
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ligations on agents of the executive branch without permitting 
his supervision (p. 386). 
Yet, those few instances are contradicted by others that the 
authors cover. For instance, they relate that the comptroller ex-
ercised final decisionmaking authority over certain disburse-
ments in President Washington's administration (p. 57). They re-
count that Attorneys General William Wirt, Roger Taney, and 
1 ohn Young Mason all argued that the president lacked the 
power to correct "the errors of judgment of incompetent or un-
faithful subordinates" (pp. 142-43). The authors state, as well, 
that the Fillmore administration asserted that the president 
lacked authority to direct accounting officers in their settlement 
of accounts (p. 151). They also note that presidents such as Tru-
man specifically disclaimed the power to direct their subordi-
nates' actions (p. 310). 
More tellingly. they omit any discussion of presidential 
views as to whether presidents enjoy the power to direct agency 
heads to reach particular positions in rulemakings or adjudica-
tions. The authors are clear that presidents should be able to dis-
charge agency heads for policy differences, presumably whether 
in fashioning rules or adjudicating cases. That position is contro-
versial in itself.2' But the authors fail to document historically or 
justify normatively the further position that presidents should be 
able to nullify or supplant agency head determinations when is-
suing rules or adjudicating disputes. 
Indeed, with relatively minor exceptions, the nullification 
theory only flowered with the administration of George W. 
Bush. President George W. Bush's signing statements and other 
initiatives portray a unitary executive that would permit the 
president to countermand a subordinate's decision. In President 
Bush's view. Congress evidently cannot delegate authority to a 
subordinate executive branch official without formally allowing 
the president to substitute his own views for those of the officer. 
In a sense. the identity of the delegate chosen by Congress would 
become largely irrelevant. Congress might as well choose to del-
eg~te to the Secretary of Labor as opposed to the Secretary of 
Defense: they are just stand-ins for the president himself. 
28. See. e.g .. A. Michael Froomkin. The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments. 88 
Nw. U. L. REV. 13..\6 (199..\): Robert V. Percival. Presidential Management of the Admin-
istrati•·e State: The Not-so-Unitar\' Exewti•·e. 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001): Peter Shane. Con-
l'etllionalism in Constitwional In-terpretation and the Place of Administrative Agencies. 36 
A~t. U. L. REV. 573 (1987): Charles Tiefer. The Constitwionality of Independent Officers 
as Checks on Anuses of Exec wive Power. 63 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1983). 
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In the signing statements, President Bush objected to a 
number of congressional directives that delegate "final" authori-
ty to a subordinate official. Although President Bush did not ex-
pound on his views, he seemingly determined that Congress, 
consistent with the theory of a unitary executive, can delegate 
such final authority only to the president. 
For instance, Congress in a 2002 DOJ Appropriations Au-
thorization Act delegated '"final authority" to a subordinate of 
the Attorney General over certain prosecutorial training grants 
abroad.~9 President Bush responded that such delegation had to 
be construed "in a manner consistent with the President's consti-
tutional authorities to supervise the unitary executive and to 
conduct the Nation's foreign affairs."30 President Bush believed 
that vesting final authority in a subordinate officer risked un-
dermining his own ability to administer the law. In the same Act, 
Congress vested in United States Attorneys, in the context of 
particular civil settlements, "the exclusive authority to select an 
annuity broker from the list of such brokers established by the 
Attorney General. "31 President Bush wrote that "the executive 
branch shall construe the section in a manner consistent with the 
President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary ex-
ecutive branch."'~ In this most routine or even trivial of adminis-
trative settings, the statement asserts that Congress cannot vest 
"exclusive" authority in any executive branch official other than 
the president- officials subordinate to the president do not en-
joy independent legal status. 
President Bush's objections to legislation directing that he 
act through a specific officer reinforces that view of a highly cen-
tralized unitary executive. For instance, in crafting an emergency 
preparedness plan, Congress provided that: 
If the President, acting through the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, determines that 1 or more substances of 
concern are being, or have been released in an area declared 
to be a disaster area ... the President, acting through the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services, may carry out a pro-
gram for the coordination, assessment, monitoring, and study 
29. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act. Pub. L. No. 107-273. 
§~ 2002.2004. 116 Stat. 1758. 1789·1790. 
30. Statement on Signing the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations 
Act. 2 PCB. PAPERS 2010.2011 (Nov. 2. 2002). 
31. ~ 11015(b ). 116 Stat. at 1824. 
32. Statement of Nov. 2. 2002. supra note 30. 
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of the health and safety of individuals with high exposure le-
vels .... "33 
To President Bush, the congressional direction that the president 
was to act through a specified individual, even though a cabinet-
level official subject to his plenary removal authority, violated 
the unitary executive. He stated that: "The executive branch 
shall construe Section 709 of the Act, which purports to direct 
the President to perform the President's duties 'acting through' a 
particular officer, in a manner consistent with the constitutional 
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive 
branch."'~ Moreover, in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 
of 2003, President Bush asserted the unconstitutionality of the 
provision that "[t]he President, acting through the Director 
General of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service of 
the Department of Commerce, is authorized to establish Tech-
nology American Centers. '' 35 Even though President Bush ex-
erted supervisory authority over the Director General, the con-
gressional specification, in President Bush's view, sapped 
presidential authority. As with the earlier set of statements, 
Congress may not purport to permit an agency official to bind 
the president: presidents must be permitted the opportunity to 
change subordinates' determinations. 
The scope of President Bush's theory of the unitary execu-
tive also is illustrated in his many signing statements asserting 
the unconstitutionality of requiring agency heads to recommend 
to Congress proposals for legislative revisions. In objecting to 
over one hu_ndr~d provisions reauirin~ agency official~ to rec-
ommend legislatiOn to Congress, President Bush seemmgly has 
embraced the view that Congress cannot compel presidential 
subordinates to make recommendations to Congress. 
For instance, in signing the Maritime Transportation Securi-
ty Act of 200237 President Bush objected to a numbers of provi-
sions which 
33. Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 109-347. 
§ 709(b )(I). 120 Stat. 1884. 1948. 
34. Statement on Signing the SAFE Port Act. 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1817 
(Oct. 13. 2006). 
35. Foreign Relations Authorization Act. Fiscal Year 2003. Pub. L. No. 107-228. 
§ 645. 116 Stat. 1350. 1403 (2002). 
36. Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner. Presidential Signing Statements and Execu-
tive Power. 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (2006) (arguing. however. that President Bush's 
signing statements did not stake out new ground). 
37. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 
2064. 
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purport to require an executive branch official to submit rec-
ommendations to the Congress. The executive branch should 
construe such provisions in a manner consistent with the Pres-
ident's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary execu-
tive branch. Moreover, to the extent such provisions of the 
Act would require submission of legislative recommendations, 
they would impermissibly impinge upon the President's con-
stitutional authority to submit only those legislative recom-
mendations that he judges to be necessary and expedient. Ac-
cordingly, the executive branch shall construe such provisions 
as requiring submission of legislative recommendations only 
where the President judges them necessary and expedient.3x 
507 
Section 110(c)(4) requires the head of the Coast Guard to 
"make[] a recommendation with respect to whether the pro-
gram, or any procedure, system or technology should be incor-
porated in a nationwide system for preclearance of imports of 
waterborne goods. "39 Section 112( 4) similarly requires a recom-
mendation "for legislative or other actions needed to improve 
security of United States ports a~ainst potential threats posed by 
flag vessels of [certain] nations." ' Congress did not bar presiden-
tial review of the proposed safety measures. Yet, to President 
Bush, these legislative provisions undermined the unitary execu-
tive, apparently by intruding into the president's constitutional 
prerogative to be the sole executive branch official to make all 
recommendations to Congress. 
For another example, in the De}i'artment of Justice Ap-
propriations Act discussed previously, Congress directed the 
Attorney General to "submit a report and a recommendation ... 
whether there should be established, within the Department of 
Justice, a separate office of the Inspector General for the Feder-
al Bureau of Investigation."42 Again, Congress did not bar the 
Attorney General from conferring with the President before the 
recommendations were made, yet President Bush objected.43 
Even officers of the United States had no role under the Bush 
conception to make proposals for legislative change. In the same 
Act, Congress required the Office of Personnel Management to 
"submit a report to Congress assessing the effectiveness of ex-
38. Statement on Signing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 2132 (Nov. 25. 2002). 
39. § 110(c)(4). 116 Stat. at 2092. 
40. § 112(4). 116 Stat. at 2093. 
41. See supra note 29. 
42. § 309(c).116 Stat. at 1784. 
43. Statement of Nov. 2. 2002. supra note 30. 
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tended assignment incentive authority as a human resources 
management tool and making recommendations for any changes 
necessary to improve the effectiveness of the incentive authori-
ty. ,.w To President Bush, that directive crossed constitutional 
lines because it "purport[ ed] to require executive branch officials 
to submit to the Congress plans for internal executive branch ac-
tivities or recommendations relating to legislation.,., The man-
datory nature of the provision clashed with his understanding of 
the unitary executive ideal. Therefore, he continued, "[ t ]he ex-
ecutive branch should construe such provisions in a manner con-
sistent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise 
the unitary executive and recommend for the consideration of 
the Congress such measures as the President judges necessary 
and expedient. "46 All recommendations to Congress apparently 
must be funneled through the Office of the President. 
As relayed by the authors:7 President Bush also changed 
the reporting relationship within each agency so that regulatory 
policy officers would report not to the agency head but to the 
president directly. President Bush evidently believed that he 
could brush aside the reporting relationship established by Con-
gress. Indeed, a Congressional Research Service Report asserted 
that: 
[W]ith the submission of the President's FY2003 budget. the 
Bush Administration appears to be attempting to transfer 
programs from agencies through funding consolidations. For 
example, the programs and $234.5 million budget of the Of-
fice of Domestic Preparedness, Department of Justice, would 
be transferred to the Federal Emergency Management Agen-
cy .... [T]he propriety of moving program responsibilities and 
related funds without statutory authority appears to be highly 
. bl -IX questwna e. 
President Bush apparently claimed the authority to rearrange 
both funding and responsibilities among executive branch agen-
cies. 
~~- § 207(d). 116 Stat. at 1780. 
~5. Statement of Nov. 2. 2002. supra note 30. 
~6. /d. 
~7. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
~8. HAROLD C. RELYEA. EXECUTIVE BRA;o.;CH REORGANIZATION AND 
MA;o.;AGEMENT INITIATIVES 8 (CRS June 12. 2002). In addition. President Bush an· 
nounced in earlv 2008 that he intended to transfer the functions of the Office of Gov· 
ernment Inform-ation Services from the National Archives to the Department of Justice. 
See White House Plan to Put New FOIA Office in Justice Department Draws Lawmakers' 
Ire. 76 U.S.L.W. 2441 (Jan. 29. 2008). 
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President Bush's Administration, however. did not consis-
tently assert a presidential power to supplant the decisions of 
subordinates. Consider an Opinion of the Office of Legal Coun-
sel, not discussed in the book, which explored whether the presi-
dent could centralize border control policy to a greater extent 
than Congress had authorized: 
Congress may prescribe that a particular executive func-
tion may be performed only by a designated official 
within the Executive Branch, and not by the President. 
The executive power confers upon the President the au-
thority to supervise and control that official in the per-
formance of those duties, but the President is not consti-
tutionally entitled to perform those tasks himself.4y 
The Opinion flatly contradicts the nullification thesis forwarded 
by the authors. 
Furthermore, President Bush never claimed the power to 
substitute his views for those of an agency head in formal rule-
making or adjudication under the Administrative Procedure 
Act. 5° Congressional directives that particular officers exercise 
administrative power are routine. The Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, for instance, issues rules and adjudicates cases 
that bind the executive branch. In common parlance, these rules, 
decisions, and orders are "final." The president can remove the 
Secretary from office if he disagrees with the rules promulgated 
or the cases adjudicated. If presidents could exercise final au-
thority over rulemaking or adjudication. the very premise of on-
the-record administration action would be compromised. To my 
knowledge, not one president has opposed the Administrative 
Procedure Act as a derogation of his authority. 
My point here is not to engage the authors as to whether, as 
a normative matter, presidents should be able to supplant the 
decisions of subordinates,51 but rather to highlight how little his-
torical support exists for such a conception. The book's careful 
assessment of longstanding presidential support for a robust re-
moval authority does not extend to other potential attributes of 
a unitary executive theory, including the power to nullify acts of 
subordinates. The authors fail to present evidence of continuous 
49. Centralizing Border Control Policy Under the Supen·ision of the Attorner Gen-
eral, 26 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL. slip op. 2 (2002). -
50. 5 u.s.c. §§ 500-596 (1966). 
51. For criticism of their theory. see Peter L. Strauss. Overseer, or "the Decider"?: 
The President in Administrative Law. 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007): Percival. mpra 
note 28. 
510 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 25:489 
presidential opposition to congressional determinations to vest 
particular responsibilities in particular agency officials. Congress 
long has viewed agency heads as distinct legal personalities. 
III. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AS A SHIELD 
In this last section, I investigate, as a preliminary matter, the 
possible salience of litigation against the federal government to 
the unitary executive theory. Litigation provides an illustrative 
context with which to assess the depth of presidents' commit-
ment to the unitary executive ideal in general and, in particular, 
to the nullification version espoused by the authors. One can 
discern presidential views towards executive power as much 
through stances in litigation as through removals, signing state-
ments, and executive orders. Although litigation patterns among 
presidents are not uniform, presidential administrations, in a 
wide variety of contexts, have asserted defenses in litigation that 
compromise the unity of the executive branch. They have ac-
knowledged the separate legal personalities of executive branch 
entities. arguing that the wrong government agency was named 
or that additional agencies needed to be named before relief 
could be granted. Presidents have not assumed responsibility for 
acts of subordinates. My goal is not to examine the probity of 
such defenses but rather to point out how problematic these liti-
gation stances are when examining the authors' sweeping claims 
for consistent presidential assertions of the nullification version 
of the unitary executive. No president, to my knowledge, has ev-
er significantly eased the path of adverse litigants for the sake of 
burnishing the image of a unitary executive in the public's eye. 
A. INTRABRANCH LAWSUITS 
In many litigations. the executive branch itself has not 
treated the federal government as one indivisible entity. One 
such instance has been remarked upon before-presidential ad-
ministrations have permitted, if not encouraged, one agency to 
sue another in seeking judicial resolution of a dispute.52 Such 
lawsuits undercut the conception of a unitary executive under 
which each official's decision represents that of the president. A 
brief inquiry into intrabranch lawsuits serves as an introduction 
52. See general/v Michael Herz. United States v. United States: When Can the Federal 
Government Sue Itself'. 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893 (1991). 
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to presidential positions in relatively routine litigation that re-
flect upon the unitary executive ideal. 
Consider the Federal Labor Relations Authority, which 
Congress created in 1978 to resolve disputes between agencies 
and their unionized employees." The FLRA can rule against 
agencies, and it subsequently can petition the appellate court to 
enforce an order. So far, six presidents have served since passage 
of the FLRA, and none, to my knowledge, has protested that on-
ly he can resolve such intrabranch disputes. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has resolved a number of disputes between the FLRA and 
another executive branch agency.54 If the president can supplant 
the decisionmaking of all executive branch subordinates, how 
can lawsuits be permitted to proceed without making a mockery 
of the nullification version of the unitary executive that the au-
thors advance? 
The FLRA cases, as well as those involving the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board," perhaps can be rationalized on the 
ground that one federal agency stands in the shoes of govern-
ment employees and thus its position with respect to the employ-
ing agencies is sufficiently adverse to permit suit. The reasoning 
may be persuasive as a matter of standing doctrine, but does not 
explain why presidents permit agencies to sue one another if 
they can nullify the decisions of subordinates. At a minimum, 
presidents have acquiesced in congressional schemes that pit one 
agency against the other. 
The history of intrabranch disputes extends more broadly. 
Most famously, President Nixon engaged the courts to contest a 
subpoena issued by the special prosecutor."' In cases of lesser no-
toriety, executive branch agencies have initiated suit against 
each other. For instance, prior to United States v. Nixon, the 
United States sued the ICC when it disagreed with its railroad 
rate determinations/7 and it later sued the FCC in a dispute over 
telephone rates.'" Moreover, the executive branch has sued to 
53. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-454. 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
54. See. e.g.. NASA v. FLRA. 527 U.S. 229 (1999): Dep·t of Defense v. FLRA. 510 
U.S. 487 (1994): Dep"t of Treasury v. FLRA. 494 U.S. 922 (1990). 
55. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory. 534 U.S. 1 (2001 ): Lachance v. Erickson. 522 U.S. 
262 (1998). 
56. United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 6S3 (1974). 
57. United States v. ICC. 337 U.S. 426 (1949): see also Ford Motor Co. v. ICC. 714 
F.2d 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Department of Defense challenged the ICCs refusal to 
award reparations for overcharges). 
58. United States v. FCC. 707 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 19S3). 
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contest _mergers and rate agreements that one of its agencies ap-
proved.w More recently, two federal agencies overseeing per-
sonnel matters lined up on opposing sides in litigation over qua-
lifications critical for the corps of administrative law judges."" 
Perhaps some of the litigation can be understood as a nod to 
the reality that, under prevailing doctrine, presidents cannot in 
fact control independent agencies but must use whatever means, 
including litigation, to ensure control."1 Yet, by permitting its 
own agencies to sue others within the executive branch, presi-
dents have perpetuated the idea of a divided executive branch. 
In any event, some litigation has been launched between 
executive branch agencies that are not considered "indepen-
dent." The Secretary of Agriculture, for instance, sued the EPA 
for suspending the registration of pesticides."2 
Presidents have, at times, endeavored to keep intrabranch 
lawsuits out of the courts, instructing agencies to bring any dis-
putes to the Attorney General for resolution."' Moreover, they 
have defended against suit by independent agencies on the 
ground that intrabranch disputes are not consistent with the uni-
tary executive.64 But, the fact that presidents have permitted and 
even launched litigation against agencies presupposes separate 
legal personalities of agencies and undermines the authors' the-
sis that presidents have acted consistently with the nullification 
65 power. 
The authors might retort that, until the president chooses to 
nullify a subordinate's acts, the subordinate maintains legal in-
dependence. They could continue that, although agencies can 
sue each other, the president has the means to halt such litiga-
59. United States v. Marine Bancorp .. 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (challenge to merger that 
had been approved by Comptroller of the Currency): United States v. Fed. Mar. 
Comm·n. 694 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 19R2) (challenge to agency approval of rate-fixing 
agreement). For a more complete discussion. see Herz. mpra note 52. 
60. Meeker v. MSPB. 319 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (pitting OPM against MSPB ). 
61. Even then. the Solicitor General represents most independent agencies in court. 
at least at the Supreme Court level. Neal Devins. Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor 
General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation. 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994). 
62. Envtl. Def. Fund. Inc. v. EPA. 54R F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
63. Herz. supra note 52. Executil·e Order No. 12,146. 3 C.F.R. 409 (1979). Even 
then. the Order does not prohibit resort to courts. but rather only imposes a preliminary 
hurdle. 
64. For relatively recent examples. see Tenn. Valley Auth. v. EPA. 278 F.3d 11R4 
(11th Cir. 2002): Dean v. Herrington. 668 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (exercising ju-
risdiction over the TV A's contract claims against the DOE). 
65. Intrabranch litigation is an affront to the theory that presidents can supplant the 
determinations of subordinates. Such cases conflict as well with the superintendence 
theory. but not as sharply. 
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tion. Yet, in the public eye. intrabranch litigation undercuts the 
notion of any nullification power and, in any event. the book is 
bereft of examples in which ;residents attempted to halt intra-
branch litigation in its tracks. 
B. STANDING AND REDRESSABILITY 
In addition to presidential acquiescence in the intrabranch 
litigation, presidents proactively have asserted the independent 
legal personalities of agencies as a shield to protect the executive 
branch from lawsuits filed by private entities. They have argued 
that, if plaintiffs cannot show that their injury is redressable by 
the particular governmental entity sued, then their case should 
be dismissed. They have refused to be accountable for injuries 
suffered due to the combined actions of subordinate governmen-
tal agencies. 
The Supreme Court first elaborated on the redressability 
component of standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife."7 The 
case arose out of a challenge to governmental aid for hydroelec-
tric projects in Egypt that allegedly harmed the environment. 
Plaintiffs challenged the Department of Interior's decision under 
the Endangered Species Act,hl' which limited the duty of federal 
agencies to consult with the Secretary over federally funded 
projects affecting endangered species. Under the regulation, 
federal agencies must consult with the Secretary over projects in 
the United States or on the high seas. but not over projects over-
seas supported by the agencies. such as one for the Aswan Dam 
in Egypt. 
For the Court, Justice Scalia held that plaintiffs had failed to 
demonstrate redressability: "instead of attacking the separate 
decisions to fund particular projects allegedly causing them 
harm. [plaintiffs] chose to challenge a more generalized level of 
Government action (rules regarding consultation).""9 By that. he 
meant that "[s]ince the agencies funding the projects were not 
parties to the case, the District Court could accord relief only 
against the Secretary. "7" The executive branch itself had argued 
against standing. reasoning that courts should not view the ex-
ecutive branch as one '"generalized" entity, but rather composed 
66. The prominent exception is President George H.W. Bush's efforts in the postal 
service dispute. See supra text accompanying note 25. 
67. 504 u.s. 555 (1992). 
68. 16 u.s.c. § 1536 (1988). 
69. Lujan. 504 U.S. at 568. 
70. !d. 
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of component parts. In its reply brief, the government stressed 
that "only the Secretary [of the Interior] is a party," and "an in-
junctive order must sgecify the federal officers who are respon-
sible for compliance." 1 The case was not redressable because the 
absent agencies would not necessarily change their conduct. 72 
Plaintiffs' claims were unsuccessful in part due to the executive 
branch's refusal to take responsibility for actions within its con-
trol.:.' 
The executive branch argued to similar effect in Bennett v. 
Spear.74 There. ranchers and water irrigation districts challenged 
a biological opinion issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
analyzing the effects of a planned Bureau of Reclamation 
project on two species of endangered fish. Under the regulatory 
scheme. agencies such as the Bureau must determine whether to 
abide by the biological opinions of the Service, a separate agen-
cy. before proceeding with planned projects. Accordingly, the 
executive branch argued that the suit should be dismissed be-
cause any injury suffered by plaintiffs could not be redressable 
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, but rather only by the 
agency that in fact proceeded on the project, the Bureau of Rec-
lamation, which was not before the Court. 75 As the executive 
branch argued in opposing certiorari, "Because petitioners' al-
leged injury results from the 'independent action of some third 
party not before the court,' they have failed to satisfy the consti-
tutional requirements for standing. "76 
To the executive branch. it was immaterial that both agency 
heads were subject to close presidential control and presumably 
reflected the president's views. Rather, the government argued 
that no standing existed in the case because all agencies had to 
be subject to the jurisdiction of the court before relief could be 
accorded the plaintiff. The agencies had separate legal personali-
ties. Although the government was not successful in urging this 
71. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 16 n.6. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 504 U.S. 
555 (1992) (No. 90-1424). 1990 U.S. Briefs 1424. 
72. See also Wilderness Soc'v v. Norton. 434 F.3d 584 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding 
non-redressable Wilderness Society's action to compel the National Park Service to seek 
the President to recommend creation of additional wilderness areas). 
73. lronicallv. Justice Scalia's redressability holding in Lujan undercuts the very 
unitarv executive ·ideal that he previously embraced in cases such as Morrison v. Olson. 
487 c:s. 654.698 (1988) (Scalia. 1.. dissenting). 
74. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
75. Brief for the Respondents at 15-20. Bennett v. Spear. 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (No. 
95-813). 1996 WL 396714. 
76. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 6. Bennett. 520 U.S. 154 (No. 95-813). 
1996 WL 33413297 (citations omitted). 
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particular argument,77 its reasoning is telling: in litigation, the ex-
ecutive branch has disclaimed at least one version of the unitary 
executive theory for, if all agencies are subject to the immediate 
control of the president-and, indeed, are mere stand-ins for the 
president himself- then plaintiffs could have received redress. 
C. FAILURE TO NAME PROPER EXECUTIVE BRANCH PARTY 
Indeed, in settings far more mundane than the standing cas-
es, the executive branch has supported distinctions drawn by 
Congress as to which agency is a proper defendant by urging that 
suits be dismissed or resubmitted when the wrong agency is on 
the caption, or when the wrong governmental official has been 
named. For example, in Williams v. Army and Air Force Ex-
change Service7x plaintiff had filed an employment discrimination 
claim arising out of her job as department supervisor for the 
Army and Air Force Exchange Service. As the court of appeals 
described, "instead of suing the Secretary of Defense or the head 
of AAFES, [she] named AAFES as the sole defendant."' 7y Coun-
sel followed that up by mailing a summons and copy of the com-
plaint to the AAFES. the U.S. Attorney General, and the U.S. 
Attorney for the relevant district. Despite the notice, the execu-
tive branch moved to dismiss the case on the ground that plain-
tiff had named the wrong governmental entity, and the court 
agreed.>«> The executive branch did not avail itself of the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate its unitariness by accepting responsibility 
for actions of subordinates and defending suit on the merits. 
Many comparable cases exist.x1 
Similarly, the government has often moved to dismiss cases 
for lack of venue, arguing that the congressional differentiation 
with respect to which official is the proper respondent be strictly 
followed. To illustrate with but one example, consider the con-
troversial case involving Jose Padilla, who was apprehended on 
77. The Court rejected the executive branch's argument in this respect. finding a 
close enough connection between the biological opinion and the ultimate relief sought by 
plaintiffs. 
78. 830 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1987). 
79. /d. at 28. 
80. !d. at 29. 
81. See. e.g., State Bank of Coloma v. Nat'l Flood Ins. Program. 851 F.2d 817 (6th 
Cir. 1988) (dismissing suit because plaintiffs had sued subordinate part of Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency instead of the Director of the agency itself): Calderon v. U.S. 
Dep't of Agric .. Food & Nutrition Serv .. 756 F. Supp. 181 (D.N.J. 1990) (dismissing case 
for failure to name United States as defendant as opposed to FNS): Rhys v. U.S. Postal 
Serv .. 702 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mass. !989) (dismissing case for failure to name Postmaster 
General as defendant). 
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suspicion of Al Qaeda links and then designated by President 
Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld as an enemy combatant.x" 
The Defense Department held Padilla in a brig off of South 
Carolina, and denied him the right to counsel. Through an attor-
ney acting as next friend, Padilla filed a petition for habeas cor-
pus, contesting the continued incarceration and violation of his 
right to counsel. 
The government responded in part by arguing that the case 
should be dismissed for failure to bring the action in the proper 
jurisdiction. Although Padilla had named as respondents the 
President, the Secretary of Defense, and the commander of the 
brig in which he was housed in South Carolina, the government 
argued that only the commander as the immediate custodian 
could be named as a respondent in a habeas corpus case. Be-
cause the case was not filed in South Carolina, the government 
argued that the case should have been dismissed. There have 
been numerous cases dismissing habeas corpus actions when the 
wrong party, such as the Attorney General, has been named in-
stead of the warder or jailer,83 and individuals contesting loss of 
parole must sue the prison warden, not the Board of Parole.>;.t Pe-
titioner, however, argued that the Secretary of Defense exer-
cised de facto control over him because of the enemy combatant 
designation so that venue would have been appropriate in New 
York where. arguably. the Secretary of Defense could have been 
sued. The lower courts agreed.x' 
On certiorari to the Supreme Court. the government's brief 
explicitly relied on Congress' differentiation of functions: "The 
habeas statutes dictate, in the context of core habeas challenges 
to present, physical confinement, that the proceedings take place 
in the federal district of confinement ... against his immediate, 
on-site custodian rather than a supervisory official located in 
another, potentially far-removed district. ,so The supervisor could 
not serve in the stead of a subordinate. despite the fact that the 
subordinate followed the supervisor's dictates. The Supreme 
Court agreed with the executive branch and ordered the habeas 
82. Rumsfeld V. Padilla. 542 u.S. 426 (2004). 
83. See. e.g .. Sanders v. Bennett. 148 F.2d 19. 20 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (holding that the 
warden and not the Attorney General is the appropriate respondent in a habeas case): 
Monk v. Sec·v of the Navy. 793 F.2d 364.369 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same). 
84. Billiteri v. U.S. Bd. of Parole. 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976). 
85. Padilla ex. rei. Newman v. Bush. 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002): Padilla v. 
Rumsfeld. 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003). 
86. Brief for the Petitioner at 16. Rumsfeld v. Padilla. 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-
1027). 2003 U.S. Briefs 1027. 
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petition to be dismissed."' holding that Rumsfeld was not an ap-
propriate respondent even though he had ordered that Padilla 
be treated as an enemy combatant and exercised continuing '"le-
gal control" over petitioner. Presidents have rarely, to my know-
ledge, rejected the refuge of congressional venue provisions to 
permit suit against a federal official, even though suit would 
have been appropriate against another official over whom the 
court had jurisdiction. 
Congress's specification of the role to be played by specific 
executive branch actors has weight, and presidents have urged 
courts to dismiss suits when the congressional specifications have 
not been adhered to, even though a different federal actor-
whether subordinate or supervisor-may have caused the injury. 
Presidents have missed an opportunity to assert the unitariness 
of the executive branch. 
D. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN AGENCY OFFICIALS AND THE 
PRESIDENTS THEY SERVE 
Moreover, the executive branch has defended against suit 
on the ground that agency determinations do not reflect presi-
dential input. Congress in a variety of contexts has set presidents 
to review agency decisions, thus suggesting a difference between 
agency and presidential determinations. Presidents have ac-
quiesced in the distinction. 
Consider the Supreme Court's decision in Dalton v. Spec-
ter."" There, a number of plaintiffs sued in part to overturn the 
Secretary of Defense's recommendation to the president to close 
a particular military base. Under the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act,"9 the Secretary was to propose closure of bases 
based on congressionally set criteria to an independent commis-
sion appointed by the president. The commission then held pub-
lic hearings and was to submit its report to the president. 
The Court held, accepting the executive branch's argu-
ments, that the commission's report was not "final agency ac-
tion" under the Administrative Procedure Act,'J(1 in that the pres-
ident need not comply with any recommendation by the 
commission. In other words. agency determinations were not 
viewed as actions of the president, but as the determinations of a 
87. Rumsfeld v. Padilla. 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
88. 511 U.S.462(1994). 
R9. 10 U.S.C. § 26R7 (19RR). 
90. 5 u.s.c. § 704 (1966). 
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distinct legal personality. Accordingly, because the president 
could not be sued directly under the AP A, the Court rejected 
the suit. Similarly, in Franklin v. Massachusetts 91 the executive 
branch successfully urged no review on the ground that census 
decisions of the Secretary of Commerce could not be imputed to 
the president.92 The executive branch did not consider the Secre-
tary's decision to reflect the views of the president. 
To be sure, one could argue that the congressional scheme 
itself is consistent with the unitary executive because it vests ul-
timate decisionmaking in the president. But, in so doing, Con-
gress has legislated a distinction between agency and president. 
and the executive branch has stood behind Congress's differen-
tiation in defending against the suit. A nullification theory pre-
supposes the potential for presidential intervention ex ante, not 
ex post. If subordinates in the executive branch can '·exercise ex-
ecutive power ... only by implicit or explicit delegation from the 
president." as the authors suggest (p. 4), then congressional ef-
forts to distinguish between the decisions of the president and a 
subordinate would be invalid. Every "final" decision of a subor-
dinate would in effect be that of the president. Yet, in litigation, 
presidents seemingly have furthered the notion that presidents 
and agencies have distinct legal personalities. By acquiescing to 
congressional structures that set presidents apart from the agen-
cy officials they control, the executive branch arguably has un-
dermined the authors' claim that presidents consistently have as-
serted a conception of the unitary executive that permits no 
salient distinction between presidents and the agencies they su-
pervise.93 
91. 505U.S.788(1992). 
92. To similar effect. see also Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp .. 333 U.S. 
103 (1948) (denying review because Civil Aeronautics Board certification of airline 
routes had yet to be approved by the president). 
93. Consider. as well. the sovereign act doctrine. which the executive branch has 
embraced to excuse contract performance by executive entities. In one of the first cases 
to articulate the doctrine. Horowitz v. United States. 267 U.S. 458 (1925). the Supreme 
Court examined the question of whether an agency's decision to embargo the shipment 
of silk was a sovereign act that precluded a different agency's prior contractual pledge to 
ship silk that the government had sold to a private entity. The Court held that 
"[w]hatever acts the government may do. be they legislative or executive. so long as they 
be public and general. cannot be deemed specially to alter. modify. obstruct or violate 
the particular contracts into which it enters with private persons." /d. at 461. The two 
characters of government- ··contractor" and "sovereign" -could not be "fused." /d. Ac-
cordingly. one agency's policy decision could excuse another entity's breach without ne-
cessitating payment of damages. . . 
Similarlv. in Derecktor v. United States. 128 F. Supp. 136 (Ct. Cl. 1954). plamllff had 
contracted ~ith the Maritime Commission. a federal agency. to purchase a ship with the 
understanding that it could be transferred to a foreign registry. The State Department 
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Finally, there are a number of cases in which the executive 
branch has argued, and the courts have agreed, including in Dal-
ton and Franklin, that there is no judicial review of presidential 
as opposed to agency officials' acts. However, if an agency offi-
cial acts only at the explicit delegation of the president, why 
should there be a difference as to reviewability? Presidents 
should stand accountable for the acts of their agency heads and 
permit review to the same extent as presidential determinations 
since all executive branch decisions stem from the same fount of 
power. Yet presidents have never complained that Congress has 
subjected agencies, but not themselves, to AP A requirements 
and the potential for judicial review. Indeed, they have asserted 
in litigation that agency officials as opposed to the chief execu-
tive should be subject to suit."~ In so doing, presidents have fur-
ther separated their own office from those of the agencies they 
control. 
A cursory examination of litigation involving the executive 
branch reveals, therefore, that presidents in defending against 
litigation have taken positions that suggest a stratified executive 
branch. Agencies have sued other agencies in court; the absence 
of all agencies before a court needed to provide relief makes a 
case nonjusticiable; naming the wrong executive branch agency 
later intervened to prevent the transfer on the ground that it might be used to smuggle 
Jewish refugees to Palestine. Plaintiff sued for damages caused by the breach of contrac-
tual terms. but the court rejected the claim. reasoning that the State Department's em-
bargo constituted a "sovereign act." excusing the Maritime Commission from contractual 
liability. As Judge Whitaker retorted in dissent: "This is a case in which this court gives 
sanction to bureaucratic action in violation of a right. this time a right acquired in consid-
eration of the payment of a large sum of money to the defendant itself. who asserts the 
power to keep the money and to deny the right for which the money was paid." /d. at 
142. He continued further that "[n]o sovereign has the power to induce the payment of 
money to it in consideration of a promise and then not keep the promise. or pay for the 
damages suffered for its failure to do so." /d. at 144. See also Conner Bros. Constr. Co. v. 
Geren. 550 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that military commander's order shutting 
down base was a sovereign act excusing delay by Corps of Engineers before allowing 
construction project to proceed). 
In a sense. the sovereign act doctrine can be understood more as a gloss on sove-
reign immunity than the unitary executive. The key issue. after all. is the nature of the 
governmental action. and it is immaterial whether the sovereign act stemmed from Con-
gress or a different governmental agency. Nonetheless. the doctrine reveals an instance in 
which the executive has gone out its way to disclaim full unitariness: one agency's prom-
ise can be breached by another's policy priority. To the litigant. the executive branch has 
refused to stand as one undivided entitv. 
94. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 731 (1982). for instance. the executive branch 
argued successfully that. although whistleblowers could bring claims directly against 
agencies for retaliation. they could not sue the president. Moreover. in cases such as Mis-
sissippi v. Johnson. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866). they have argued that federal courts can 
enjoin agency officials but not the presidents who order them to take particular positions. 
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is grounds for dismissal, and agency head decisions are not 
deemed to be those of the president. Taken together, these posi-
tions strongly indicate that presidents have staked out claims in-
consistent with the nullification version of the unitary executive 
advocated by the authors, and thus undermine the authors' the-
sis that there has been a consistent executive practice in this re-
spect. 
CONCLUSION 
Steven Calabresi and Christopher Y oo have performed a 
great service by exploring every president's exercise of the re-
moval power. They relay the circumstances leading up to the 
removals, relate relevant presidential pronouncements, and de-
pict the controversies that from time to time arose. 
As a historical work gauging the extent to which each presi-
dent's practice conformed with the unitary ideal, however, the 
book warrants only an incomplete. The book is both over and 
underinclusive in presenting examples during the respective 
presidential administrations. Moreover, the book's assertion of a 
nullification power is not even borne out by the examples that 
the authors themselves provide, and finds only limited support 
elsewhere. Had the authors examined the positions staked out in 
litigation by the executive branch, they would have been even 
more hard pressed to point to a nullification power in particular, 
for presidents widely have accepted and indeed furthered a con-
viction that executive agencies have distinct legal personalities. 
Thus. although the book's focus on the pivotal role of the re-
moval authority throughout our history is exemplary, a more 
complete historical analysis of the unitary executive remains to 
be written. 
